This is not security. This is a waste of time.

So USA Today has a much-noticed article about the TSA approving special cases that would allow travelers to go through security at airports without having to remove their laptops from their carrying cases. Basically, the cases would open and you'd lay them flat on the conveyor belt, with the laptop on one side and everything else on the other.

Supposedly, this is going to speed up security. It won't. It's a complete and total waste of time and energy, and the companies who are building these spiffy new cases are simply opportunists. I don't blame them for that - this is America, after all - but I'm certainly not going to let people celebrate them as helping out the weary traveler.

As someone who flies at least 20 times a year and never lets my laptop get more than a few feet away from me, I can assure you that it's not a hassle at all to take your laptop out of the carrying bag and put it in a bin. Most soft briefcases now have a handy slot just for your laptop, and all you do is slide it out of the slot, but it in the bin, put it through the machine, and then slide it back in. That's just as easy, if not easier, than opening a case, lying it flat, and then closing it back up again. Plus, the soft case can hold much more stuff than the specially designed "clamshell" case, so you'd probably just have carry-on difficulties with it.

Further, how is this "clamshell" going to speed anything up? As long as anything is going through a machine, nothing is sped up. All of the preparation is done while you're in the security line, a few people back from whoever is going through the metal detector. You're still going to have to put your shoes, jacket, carry-on, etc., through the x-ray machine, so there's no extra time taken at the bottle neck - when you actually pass your body through the metal detector - and once you're through the bottle-neck, who cares how long it takes to gather up your stuff? At that point, the line part is over.

The only ways the lines could possibly be reduced:

1. More screeners: If there's a metal detector for every 50 people in line, instead of one for every 500 people in line, things will go faster. Money and space issues mean we've pretty much got what we're going to get here. My local airport in Portland has a line out the door every morning, but it's simply because everybody has to pass through one of two security checkpoints and 10 flights all leave at roughly the same time. If you fly out at 11 a.m., you can show up about 20 minutes before your flight leaves and breeze right onto the plane.

2. A giant gateway that everybody could just walk through without having to put anything on a conveyor belt: Not as impossible as it sounds - companies like Brijot that do full body imaging can get pretty close to a solution for this, although the people manning the machines would have to be mighty alert and not let people get away from them by sprinting through or something. This won't happen any time soon.

3. People fly much less: With increasing fuel prices and airlines going belly up left and right, this will happen sooner than you think. Pretty soon, corporations will start cutting down more significantly on business travel and air travel for the middle class will go back to being a luxury few can afford. Less crowded airports means small security lines. Yay!

Look, I'm all for efforts like Clear and Flo that look to expedite things for a price. It's solution #1, and it makes the people who are desperate for speed foot the bill. I'll buy a membership as soon as the lanes come to Portland (which should happen in 2017 or so, I'm guessing, by which time we'll all be video conferencing anyway). But most of these other solutions, like making it so you can keep your shoes on, or your laptop in your case, or your jacket on your back, are just solutions aimed at whiney, annoying people who can't stand a little inconvenience for the sake of satisfying the masses' need to feel safer about air travel. None of them saves any time at all, really, and, anyway, I've stood in a boatload of security lines and not one has been more than about 15 minutes.

Who among you is so desperate for that 15 minutes back? What, so you can watch 15 more minutes of the Today show before you leave for your flight? So you can get 15 more minutes of sleep? Boo hoo. Just take your laptop out of its case like everybody else and be quiet. Or waste $100+ on the special carrying case if it makes you feel empowered.

Can I get an analytics salesman on the phone?

I'm sure everybody's heard about the most recent troubles at Heathrow airport, including yesterday's event, where a man scaled a fence and waltzed onto the runway before being challenged and then arrested.

Where, oh where, is the security industry in all of this? The mainstream media and government officials are being allowed to spout all manner of wrongness and no one in the security industry is being interviewed or offering their two cents. This is the perfect time, whether you're in Europe or in Kansas, to offer up guest editorials or offer yourselves as technology and systems experts.

Just look at this bit:

Gordon Brown, the prime minister, said he was satisfied everything was being done to ensure security at Heathrow. Speaking after arriving at an EU summit in Brussels, he said: "I think the important thing about the Heathrow incident is that the person was detained, that all the security precautions went quickly into action ... and that all possible steps were taken so that when this incident happened the arrest took place. And I'm satisfied everything is now being done to ensure security at Heathrow is intact. We are determined to protect all passengers and all staff who go through Heathrow and every other airport in the country."

What? Is this guy on crack? A man was allowed to walk right under a passenger airplane carrying a backpack! Hey, England, you got lucky. All possible steps were not taken in any way, shape, or form. There are some very inexpensive (relatively) solutions that would have alerted you the moment somebody started climbing the fence. Remember when I wrote about Optellios at ASIS? Heathrow just opened a $8.6 billion terminal. They couldn't pony up a bit more for some fiberoptic cable and some software to make sure their perimeter was secure?

Or how about some off-the-shelf perimeter analytics? Anybody can do fenceline nowadays. There would have been buzzers going off like no tomorrow in the central command center at Heathrow as soon as that guy got within 10 feet of the fence and he never would have made the tarmac.

I have major reservations about the people in charge of aviation security in England after reading the following:

The former head of security at BAA, Norman Shanks, said a higher fence would not prevent further incursions and a serious clampdown on intruders would require sophisticated motion-sensor technology.

A number of systems are available or under development, including CCTV technology that detects irregular movement. However, such a move would increase the cost of a Heathrow security bill that has risen by tens of millions of pounds since the liquid bombs scare in 2006.

The perimeter at Heathrow is jointly patrolled by BAA security staff and the Metropolitan police. One aviation expert said it had not changed since the September 11 2001 attacks on the United States which showed al-Qaida's continued fascination with attacking aviation.

A BAA spokesman said: "If there are lessons to be learned, they will be learned."

A higher fence? Seriously? "Sophisticated motion-sensor technology"? What's wrong with that? You just spent $8.6 billion! There's wasn't $1,000,000 (and that's just an arbitrary large number - no way it would have cost that much) for some perimeter security? "CCTV technology that detects irregular movement"? Seriously, the security industry needs to be out there educating the general population about what's available. If the mainstream public knew about the technologies, and their relative affordability, they would not stand for a perimeter system at the largest airport in England going un-upgraded since 2001. That's borderline criminal.

Israel, Day 5

Before I get into what was a very busy day visiting Ben Gurion Airport, the Azrieli Center (three skyscrapers attached to a large mall), and Israel Railways operations, I wonder if you took note of this story: Hezbollah intelligence chief Imad Mughniyeh was killed with a car bomb in Damascus, Syria (not far from here in Tel Aviv). The Israelis haven't gone so far as to take credit, but I can tell you that no one here is playing violins for him either.

It may sound callous, but one of our hosts described the bombing this way: "He took a long flight, without a boarding pass." Of course, Avi was a member of the Israeli Army and fought Hezbollah directly, so you can imagine that he has no love for one of its leaders.

The Israelis are not below counter-acts of terrorism, certainly. I asked Amotz, another of our tour leaders, today if it was offensive for me to say that Menachim Begin was a terrorist (you may not know that the former prime minister here began his career as a leader of the Israeli resistance against Great Britain, which would not allow immigrants to come to Israel following the end of WW 2; he quite famously blew up part of the King David Hotel, which was serving at the time as the British army HQ, and where we stayed earlier this week). Amotz said no, he agreed, Begin was a terrorist. He said there are still Israeli terrorists. There are American terrorists. He said the difference is that Israel and the United States make an active effort to keep terrorists within their borders from acting in that fashion, while the leaders of the Palestinians, Hezbollah and Hamas, encourage such acts.

What about Mughniyeh's killing? Was that terrorism, counter-terrorism, an act of war? It's unclear, really. We live in a time, I would argue, when old terminology doesn't apply well.

I can tell you, however, that terminology isn't particularly important to the heads of security at Ben Gurion, Azrieli, and the rail system. They simply know that people are repeatedly trying to kill their customers and are doing everything possible to both protect those customers and make sure they continue to have customers. As Nahum Liss, technically the head of planning, control and projects at Ben Gurion, put it: "You can have 100 percent security, but then you have zero percent aviation activity."

Sadim, the chief security officer at Azrieli, noted, however, that while private security is "a big headache for the client," the customers coming to the mall expect and appreciate the security measures. One customer, he said, asked to speak to him personally, recently, only to say that he had surveyed his security measures and approved of them. "This is the only mall I'll shop in," he reportedly told Sadim.

While the three operations all use varying levels of technology, it's clear from their presentations (and from this week's presentations in general) that all three value people and policies much more highly. "We're always upgrading our technology," Sadim said, "we're always looking for ways to do our job better, but technology is just a tool. It can't replace people."

This echoed our training from earlier in the week, given by Amotz, if you'll remember, and the sentiment of the Sergeant at Arms of the Knesset. Security, they said is about profiling methods of operation, and has three steps: Detect, Determine, Deploy. The technology can only help with the detecting part. It can't think, or ask questions, and it can't make the decision to deploy (or shouldn't).

That said, the all three locations had some pretty cool technology, especially Ben Gurion.

But, here, watch the video first (sorry that I seem to be confused as to whether this is my fourth or fifth day here - the time change is messing with me):



It has 2,300 security employees to serve its 10.1 million annual passengers, and they use all manner of profiling techniques along with the universal concept here of "security circles." The first circle is the Israeli intelligence operation, the second is the fence line: Ben Gurion is the only airport in the world that has a fence around all public areas. There are only two gates through which to enter, and everyone entering is spoken with and profiled. Those who show suspicion indicators are questioned further, and those who have suspicions that can't be refuted are searched.

This can take up to an hour. Do not make jokes at the gates to Ben Gurion. And keep the heater down. You don't want to be sweating.

Then the circles move in as you might imagine, with such measures as $3,000 blast-proof trash cans and very-armed guards patrolling everywhere. We were told to try to spot the snipers, but I'm not sure if they were kidding or not. I didn't see any, but I'm guessing I wouldn't.

Then they have all manner of CT-scan, X-ray, video analytic, license plate recognition, bollards, and more than 700 cameras throughout the airport and airfield. Their access control system for employees involves a prox card tied to a biometric, very similar to HSPD-12/FIPS 201. And, you guessed it, they're about to implement shoe-screening technology, so you won't have to take your shoes off. Hopefully, they export that to the United States quickly.

As everywhere in Israel, and I've mentioned before, virtually all of the security guards here and at the other two sites, are young, no more than 25. They are students, working part-time as they study (they've already been in the military), and they are good at what they do. While you'll see them joking around from time to time, and their silly photos lining break-room walls, they are also decisive, attentive, and they catch things all the time. When they are "red-teamed," meaning tested, they mostly pass, we're told.

One of the coolest things Liss had in place at Ben Gurion was software that gave him a quick representation of his preparedness for an attack. All employees, and the technology, are graded constantly for effectiveness. If a guard doesn't pass a test, he or she doesn't work the next day. It's that simple. They are given more training to get their numbers up. Today the facility's number was an 89. Because it was clear that Liss had no tolerance for failure, this seemed like a high, and encouraging, number.

There is no doubt, as Liss said, that Ben Gurion is the safest airport in the world. I asked him if he felt unsafe when he traveled through the other airports of the world.

"You're an American?" he asked immediately. He laughed. He had been asked last year to evaluate the efforts at LAX and Denver. He thought their front doors were well secured he said, but "the back doors of most American airports are wide open." He felt the perimeters were less than secure and that we needed to secure them, "but that's not an easy thing to do." He also felt we needed to develop our own profiling system and that we needed to get higher quality guards. "Employees are paid much better here," he said, "and the quality is much better." He also spends $60 million a year on security.

Sadim spends about $2 million to protect his 45,000 daily visitors each year. He's got 250 cameras, uses prox cards for employees, and also has a conversation with every car that comes to park in his parking garage. His system, like all private security measures, must meet a minimum standard established by the police. He had to apply for a permit before the business could open to the public, and that permit must be renewed each year.

Can you imagine that in the United States? I wouldn't hesitate to guess that the Maine Mall would resist such permitting strenuously. Many of us noted, however, that it likely thinks nothing of making sure its fire system is up to code. How many people have died in mall fires? I'm guessing none in the past 25 years. How many people have died in attacks on malls? Unfortunately, we know that number has increased recently. That gunman wouldn't have sniffed the front door here.

Speaking of sniffing, we got a demonstration of the effectiveness of the Railways' K-9 unit as part of the day's last presentation. Cute dog. He could probably use some My Good Dog toys (sorry, couldn't help a plug for my old man's business - the rules are looser here on the blog, right?). Yosi, head of security for the Railways, maybe gave the biggest endorsement to his technology efforts; he's about to embark on a campaign to use a camera to cover every meter of the 900 km of rail line he's responsible for (and another 500 km of line is going to be added over the next four years or so). Do the math there.

He showed us a demonstration of what the system can do, as it identified a fake terrorist as he walked into a tunnel and placed a bag on the tracks using video analytics, and then the command center contacted patrol guards in the field, who were able to quickly arrive on the scene, and the train operators, who were able to keep their cars from entering the tunnel.

He also showed us video of the most recent bombing attempt thwarted: Just last month, five men were apprehended with the detonator for a bomb that had already been placed on the side of some tracks. They intended to move the bomb to the tracks and detonate it when a trail came across it. The Israeli intelligence services won this time. In five other cases, they won as well. Another time, a guard was killed in stopping a suicide bomber before he reached a station. We saw a video that showed how far the head of the bomber was shot up into the sky when he detonated. Gruesome.

Another video showed us a 14-year-old boy who was apprehended with a bomb strapped to his chest, sent in by Hezbollah.

You can see, maybe, why today's car bomb in Damascus wasn't something these people were overly concerned about.

Getting to Israel

Those of you diligent readers of my monthly editorial know that I am now in Israel, having spent the better part of the last 24 hours getting here. I am traveling here as part of a tour package put together by Chameleon Associations and sponsored by Infrastruct Security (check out Andrew Wray's blog off that homepage, too) that will eventually bring us to many of the major security installations in Israel, as well as put us in front of a number of experts in counter-intelligence, counter-terrorism, emergency management, and general physical security. Over the course of the next seven days, I'll be providing reports on what I'm learning, what I'm seeing, and what the general atmosphere is here in Israel, arguably the most security-conscious nation in the world.



Today, I saw many indications of how seriously Israel does (and doesn't really) take its security.

First of all, upon arriving in the Newark airport from the Portland International Jetport (we can fly to Toronto, thus it's international), I found I couldn't go directly to my gate for the second leg to Tel Aviv. Why? Well, there's a second security checkpoint, independent of the one you go through to get to the gates area, just to get into the gate area from which the plane to Tel Aviv departs.

This is Israel taking security seriously. You do not get on a plane to Israel unless you've been wanded and someone has looked through your bag. It's that simple. Then they check you in a second time, matching your face, your passport, and your ticket.

This is Israel not really taking security seriously. The guy who wanded me got a beep for metal at both of my pockets (cell phone, keys), at my belt (belt buckle) and at my wrist (watch), but was completely uninterested in what was setting off the beep. I guess he was just trusting that it was unlikely that I had gotten a knife through the first security checkpoint, and therefore didn't need me to empty my pockets, but what then was the point of wanding me? Likely, just to make people feel safer. Similarly, the guy who pawed through my bag wasn't even really looking at it. He was just sticking his hand in there because it was his job.

Still, as a deterrence measure, this treatment tells potential bad guys not to bother, I figure.

Similarly, once we arrived at Ben Gurion Airport in Tel Aviv, there was a security guy who "black-beaned" me (picked me out randomly, like the black bean in a jar of white beans -- what do you want from me, I just picked the term up. I didn't invent it) and asked me a few questions and looked at my passport before I even got to the passport checkpoint. Still, it was more of a formality than anything else. He either picked me because I looked like a dumb American unclear as to where to go, or because I was number 20. It's doubtful I met some kind of profile of a potential danger (although it's possible handsome guys with beards and stylish Brooks Brothers blazers have been identified as likely threats...).

By the way, here's what Tel Aviv looks like from the air:



Tomorrow, I'll get into the meat of the conference and have more to report, along with some video of the cool stuff we've seen at the Jerusalem bus station. Stay tuned (those of you surfing the SSN web site on a Sunday, after a couple of weeks of our site being down -- there must be dozens of you!).